In its Van 
The Premises of the Judgment
In its Van Gend en Loos judgment, 1 the ECJ (now CJEU) gave a teleological justification for its view that Community law not only 'imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage' 2 and can be invoked before national and Community courts. The Court was concerned that a different outcome 'would remove all direct legal protection' of the individual rights of the Community's nationals: '[t] here is the risk that recourse to the procedure under these Articles would be ineffective if it were to occur after the implementation of a national decision taken contrary to the provisions of the Treaty '. 3 Since 'this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states', and in light of the need to protect the rights of individuals and ensure the effective implementation of the treaty, it makes little sense to rely solely on the states, or more accurately on state executives that represent their respective states in the international arena. Instead, the ECJ looks through the veil of sovereignty and observes two important actors: the individual citizen, and the national court. The judgment assigns to citizens directly enforceable rights vis-à-vis their respective state executives, and it assigns the national courts the obligation to protect those rights: 'according to the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the Treaty, Article 12 must be interpreted as producing direct effects and creating individual rights which national courts must protect'. Ibid., at 12. Ibid., at 13. 4 Ibid., ibid. The very same case provides an initial answer: the three states that appeared before the ECJ -the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany -tried to convince the Court to defer to their discretion. They did not want to be legally accountable to their citizens or to share responsibility for the implementation of the treaty with their own courts. They made this argument despite the fact that two of them (Belgium and the Netherlands) had been responsible for the infringement that Van Gend en Loos was complaining about by their signing of a Protocol that was incompatible with the EC Treaty. The Commission did not react to this breach -most likely because it was not aware of a relative minor infringement, the imposition of a higher import duty by a local customs agency.
This, then, is one premise that informs the ECJ: to ensure that an international or ganization (IO) is effective and accountable to the citizens, it is not enough to leave matters in the hand of state executives and the bureaucracy of the organization. It turns out that this argument, cited by Italian judge Trabucchi in his internal memorandum, managed to convince a bare majority of four out of the court's seven judges.
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A second premise is implied: national courts (NCs) can effectively function as reviewing bodies of the policies of state executives, and thereby take part in protecting individuals and implementing the Treaty. The courts are independent both of state executives and of the interest groups that support them. Their independence is guaranteed by the EC Treaty itself which resolves various collective action problems that the courts would otherwise face.
7 As a result, such a law-based order is generally less susceptible to power and manipulation. Yet while this premise may have informed the Court, we believe that it is not crucial to explaining the Court's reliance on national courts as a check on state executives.
We suspect that there is a third premise operating in the background of the judgment that is never fully articulated but ultimately more influential: that the cooperation of national courts among themselves, and with the guidance and backing of the ECJ will help protect citizens of the relatively weaker countries in the organizationthe Benelux countries in this case, developing countries in the global context -from predatory policies by the more powerful states. While smaller Member States stood to benefit relatively more than the larger members from the opening of the markets in the EC, their executives could have remained subjected to pressures from the stronger ones. Indeed, given the interest of the smaller Common Market countries in openness, it was surprising to see the Belgian and Dutch governments joining Germany in objecting to the direct effect rule of the Court. The Court may well have taken notice of this same inconsistency and inferred that smaller governments were under external pressure to argue against their interests and would continue to be so in the future unless protected.
That the three smaller members of the EEC were keen to embrace the EC Treaty and give it legal effect was already reflected in their national law. The Dutch Constitution of 1953 provided for the supremacy of international treaties over domestic statutes. 8 The Luxembourg Court of Cassation (in 1950) and its Conseil d'État (in 1951) acknowledged the supremacy of treaty obligations over local laws. 9 In Belgium 'the van Gend en Loos decision, though revolutionary, created hardly a ripple at the time', 10 given the pro-integration attitude of the 'most outstanding' members of the Belgian judiciary.
11 The Belgian Procureur Général Ganshof van der Meersch stated that the Rome Treaty created a common legal order whose subjects are not only states but also their citizens. 12 The celebrated judgment of the Belgian Court of Cassation in its 1971 Le Ski decision, 13 which endorsed monism and accepted the primacy of EEC law, was considered a 'logical and easy' 14 application of the principle of direct effect. These three small states fully grasped the benefits of international cooperation and that arguing in favour of the EC Treaty was clearly within their self-interest. They, and the Netherlands in particular, signalled to the ECJ that they would accept and follow its judgments whatever they might be. In the event that France or Germany did not accept its rulings, 15 they would be the ones to be regarded as the violators of the Treaty, whereas the ECJ would be deemed its guardian. 16 Finally, there was a fourth premise: that the ECJ, with the cooperation of the NCsat least the NCs of the three smaller members -was sufficiently independent of the state executives and the EC institutions to protect the rights of citizens. The Court's interpretation was protected from subsequent modifications of the Treaty, given the 8 The Dutch constitution of 1953 was designed to provide supremacy to EC law (including ECJ decisions 18 In addition, the judgment was likely to be implemented by the Dutch court. 19 The judges therefore knew that the Dutch court would carry out their judgment regardless of the position of the Dutch government. This is a key consideration for a court concerned about compliance with its judgments. 20 Also, personally the judges felt safe. At the time, the 'longstanding tradition' promised the ECJ judges reappointment to another six-year term if they so wished. 21 Furthermore, the appointment process involved 'complicated political negotiations at the national level' 22 and the anonymous decisions made it 'hard to pin activism on any particular national appointee '. 23 In this article we would like to explore these four premises and examine their justification from the perspective of protecting individual rights and ensuring the effectiveness of the international organization, as well as from the perspective of strengthening democracy -judged by the effective and informed voter participation in public decisionmaking -within the EU and within its Member States. Although judicial intervention often pre-empts public deliberation, it can also encourage it; although it may operate to pre-empt the vote, it can also function to ensure it. This was particularly true in Europe. As Weiler argued in his seminal piece on the transformation of Europe, 24 the Van Gend 'revolution' which closed the exit option for Member States increased their effort to voice their preferences at the Community decision-making bodies. In addition to taking decision-making at the IO level more seriously, the costs that judicial intervention imposed were far outweighed by their benefits when compared to the counterfactual of domination by the executives of the most powerful states parties. Below we argue that democratic failures at both the national and international levels can be best addressed through greater interaction and coordination between national and international tribunals. Such coordination has proven itself capable of promoting democracy at both 17 European integration' when he appointed to the ECJ the French judge Lecourt, and thereby unwillingly contributed to the outcome in Van Gend (supra note 6, at 90-91). The anonymous decisions also strengthened the legitimacy of the Court's judgment: it is not hard to imagine the consequences of a published opinion with only a bare 4:3 majority in favour of the direct effects doctrine.
the domestic and the international levels by helping to ensure that the interests of a greater proportion of relevant stakeholders are taken into account by decision-makers and that the resulting outcomes are more appropriately informed and balanced. We further argue that 'democracy' in this context must be understood to provide a voice to foreigners who are often excluded from domestic and global decision-making processes.
The Democratic Failures Associated with State Executives Acting on the Supranational Level
Traditionally, democratic failures are analysed from an internal perspective, namely discrimination against discrete and insular minorities or capture by indigenous interest groups. But with the move to supra-national policy making and enforcement and the increased dependency of states' on foreign actors, three additional reasons have emerged for worrying about the deterioration of the individuals' capacity for agency. First, the continuous lowering of the technical and legal barriers to the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital across territorial boundaries has both further marginalized the voices of 'discrete and insular minorities' 25 and strengthened the hand of those domestic actors who stand to benefit from the increased availability of 'exit' options from the state, for example, by relocation or reinvestment, that globalization offers. 26 Moreover, the newly established global venues for regulation, which remain inaccessible and quite opaque for most voters, have enabled better organized and better funded groups to exploit asymmetric information about the goals and consequence of regulation.
A second, more fundamental type of challenge to domestic democratic processes stems from the lack of congruence between the population of enfranchised voters and the population of parties affected by the voters' decisions. The basic assumption of state democracy -that there is a strong overlap between these two populationsmight have been correct in a world of 'separate mansions', when territorial boundaries defined not only the persons entitled to vote but also the community that was primarily affected by the choices made. Today, however, this condition is rarely met, and the consequences manifest themselves in two ways. First, voters in one country affect stakeholders in foreign countries, without the latter having the right to participate in the vote or otherwise to influence the decisions that are made. This has led to the growing acknowledgment that the 'geography-based constituency definition introduces an arbitrary criterion of inclusion/exclusion right at the start'. 27 foreign actors increasingly employ economic leverage to influence both local candidates and domestic public opinion in other states. While this phenomenon may temporarily compensate for their lack of voting power, it operates to distort the domestic democratic process and to disenfranchise their citizens.
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A third challenge that globalization poses for democracy springs from the proliferation of small and medium-sized states that face increasing competition for access to foreign investment and foreign markets. Weaker states that find it difficult to bundle up their disparate preferences often discover that they have to submit to the dictates of a few powerful actors and the global institutions they have created. 29 Separated by political boundaries and often divided by high levels of political, social, and economic heterogeneity, they generally find it difficult to act collectively. This often makes it relatively easy for a strong economic or political actor -be it a powerful state or a wealthy investor -to practise 'divide and rule' strategies against them. These strategies further erode the capacity of weak sovereigns for collective action and effectively confine them to different 'cells' in what amounts to a maze of prisoners' dilemmas.
As a result of these failures, the prevailing assumption that state executives are willing and able adequately to represent the interests of their respective constituencies in international bargaining or in their negotiations with bureaucracies of IOs that are controlled by state executives is largely unrealistic. The move to policy-making at the supra-national level increases the space for special interests' control of the outcomes. This phenomenon has been observed in the EU: the powerful members of the EU not only were able to exert more influence on the policies adopted by the EU institutions, 30 they were also less likely to comply with them. A study of compliance with EU policies between 1972 and 1993 found that cases of non-compliance in the EU rise with bargaining power in the Council. 31 This has led to the observation that powerful states implement IO policies less frequently simply because these 'strategic actors can safely choose not to implement'. asymmetric information in democracies. Since, as suggested above, the policy-making processes at the global level are considerably more opaque than those at the domestic level in most democratic societies, the move to supranational decision-making has increased the need for courts to embrace an additional remedial balancing role. Yet, to date NCs have generally hesitated to challenge their respective executives because they feared that acting alone against the government, or against the IO of which their state was a member, might harm their economy or their state's foreign relations. Most likely, they have also feared potential government non-compliance with the judgment.
Fortunately, the Rome Treaty 33 provided the NCs with an invaluable tool to overcome this collective action problem: recourse to the ECJ to interpret the Treaty. Such interpretation would bind all actors and require other NCs to follow suit. The Benelux NCs had another guarantee for ensuring at least partial adherence to the outcome: the domestic law in these jurisdictions ensured that the ECJ's interpretation would trump domestic law, and therefore all Benelux NCs would conform to the ECJ ruling.
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For the Benelux countries, a strong European Court and strict adherence to the EC Treaty not only promised to open the much larger markets of the big three, but also offered protection against potentially predatory policies adopted by a qualified majority. The ECJ had the largest proportional representation of the small countries of all major EEC institutions and thus was relatively the most favourable European institution for them. 35 In anticipation of the introduction of the qualified majority vote, a strong ECJ gave them an assurance that a strong constitutional court grants minorities. Thus, even if the referred cases were not directly related to economic or regulatory disparities between different Member States, the basic policy of supporting an evolving constitutional order through a strong Court was the smaller states' underlying long-term preference. And indeed, the Benelux NCs referred questions to the ECJ significantly more often (relative to the size of their population) than those of the courts of the bigger states, 36 while the courts of the big three -France, Germany, and Italy -regarded the ECJ with suspicion. 37 The latter -the French courts in particularwere significantly less enthusiastic about making references to the ECJ, and made it clear that they would not automatically embrace the ECJ's rulings. The German and 33 Supra note 5. 34 See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text. 35 The ECJ comprised seven members, of whom three were from the small states (the Commission was composed of nine members, no more than two from any one state In fact, the successful counter-executive cooperation between the ECJ and the Benelux courts is a case study of the larger phenomenon of cooperation between NCs and international tribunals (ITs) that can at least partially remedy the democratic failures inherent in global governance. NCs realized that this new environment was not one in which NCs could continue to give their states' executives a free hand to fashion global regulatory policies as they see fit. Such unchecked power could impoverish the domestic democratic and judicial processes and dramatically reduce the opportunity of citizens to promote their preferences. ITs that share this concern can rely on NCs to form together a pro-democracy coalition vis-à-vis state executives and the IO bureaucracies. 38 The improved cooperation between international and national courts can potentially help both types of institutions in their relations with their domestic and international executives. Their symbiotic relationship is based on the relatively greater independence of NCs as opposed to ITs from the pressures generated by coalitions of powerful states and the stronger domestic public support for NCs, on the one hand, and on the greater capacity of ITs effectively to monitor the policy compliance of any particular state, on the other hand. The relative greater independence and domestic legitimacy of NCs can indirectly and inadvertently contribute to the strengthening of IT review capacity in the international sphere because ITs can find support in NC activism.
NCs, in turn, also benefit from stronger ITs. This is particularly true when the two share an interest in curbing the growth of executive power. ITs also bring resources to the table that in certain situations can prove to be invaluable to NCs. ITs can facilitate coordination between NCs by endorsing, or at least by not opposing, their shared interpretation of the law. In addition, their endorsement of NC jurisprudence by, for example, regarding it as reflecting customary law can lend added legitimacy to its decision and help pressurize recalcitrant courts in other states to comply with a given NC ruling. Such endorsement can also operate to pre-empt the possibility of a government threatening to 'appeal' a national court decision before an IT. While a measure of mutual dependence and vulnerability between NCs and ITs can occasionally cause friction, they can also serve as the basis for productive dialogue and cooperation. Defragmentation -if carefully coordinated between NCs and ITs -potentially benefits both in this regard. 39 NCs are likely to welcome the efforts of ITs to defragment the international legal system and to broaden their authority when these actions reduce the extent to which executive branches can employ IOs to escape domestic accountability and traditional constitutional constraints. 38 On this prospect see Benvenisti and Downs, 'National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law', 20 EJIL (2009) 59 (noting the promise of NC-IT cooperation in enhancing domestic democracy and creating a more coherent international regulatory apparatus). 39 In saying this we do not mean to suggest that the judges share similar motivations, only that the expansion of the role of the judiciary and judicial discretion are phenomena that benefit judges irrespective of the microfoundations of their individual decision making.
Similarly, ITs are likely to tolerate increased NC review if it also provides them with increased legitimacy and increases the likelihood that they will escape retribution if they deviate from the outcome preferred by executives of the powerful states. If NCs are expected to rule against them, executives may also be more inclined to tolerate the ruling of ITs. As we will see below, there is reason to believe that the effects of regulatory fragmentation on ITs and NCs are quite different but they can often be strategically complementary.
In sum, while serious areas of potential disagreement exist between NCs and ITs and are likely to continue to occur intermittently, both will generally be better off if they coordinate their actions. Acting independently in a globalizing environment will only perpetuate judicial marginalization and facilitate the further expansion of executive discretion.
How Cooperation between National and International Courts Enhances Democracy
In this section we argue that judicial activism in the face of collective action on the part of state executives potentially advances democratic goals in three ways: (a) it enhances the domestic democratic processes threatened by state executives' collusion by providing necessary information from which individual voters may benefit; (b) it reduces the leverage of powerful foreign actors that thrive on the divisions among weaker countries; and (c) it provides at least some voice to those formally excluded from decision-making, including those of foreign status.
A Inter-Court Coordination and the Facilitation of Democratic Deliberation at the Domestic Level
The democratic process is based on votes, but not only on votes. Voting is a precondition for a functioning democracy, but for democracy to function voting must be complemented with other safeguards that can supply information to voters about their choices and ensure the accountability of elected representatives in following them. 40 We do know that voting itself is a poor way of shaping political outcomes even in the national context. As suggested by Rokkan, 'votes count in the choice of governing personnel, but other resources decide the actual policies pursued by authorities'. 41 Public choice scholarship supports this observation, emphasizing the role of small interest groups in shaping national policies, based on the counter-intuitive observation that smaller groups obtain more political power than larger groups. 42 We can therefore, following Anthony Downs' observations, 43 In general, NCs, in the course of their proceedings, generate information and make it widely available to a broad range of political actors, as well as to the public. By doing so they can be instrumental in reacting to the inherent deficiency of democracy. Yet in most discussions concerning the democratic legitimacy of judicial review, this contribution to democratic deliberation is overshadowed by the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty. 44 This may be unavoidable in connection with the ultimate approval or disapproval of controversial issues such as the legality of abortion or same-sex marriage. However, the saliency associated with these 'yes or no' moments can often lead observers and analysts to ignore the many subtle, indirect, and yet significant contributions that NCs make to the vibrancy of the political system and to public deliberation. Even more importantly, such isolated instances of politically salient judge-made law deflects public attention from the most persistent countermajoritarian difficulty that lies in the impoverished character of domestic democratic deliberations that are captured by interest groups. This is doubly true in the current global arena, where the countermajoritarian difficulty that inheres in insufficiently transparent domestic deliberations is exacerbated by the domination of most IOs and ITs by a handful of powerful state executives. 45 In such circumstances, judicial intervention -particularly in its collective or coordinated form -has a critical role to play. While judges are not trained to be expert policymakers, they are trained to be expert fact finders. This expertise in employing fact-finding procedures also enables them credibly to monitor the decision-making procedures of administrative agencies. The relative insulation of judges from executive domination and from the influence of special interests lends credibility to the information they generate. 46 As we shift our gaze to inter-court coordination and examine the effects of courts' review of an IO on domestic democratic processes, we observe similar outcomes.
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When NCs directly or indirectly decline to implement an IO demand, they increase public awareness about the demand and raise the stakes for the IO or the national executive branch. But in most instances they do not pre-empt public deliberation. For example, an NC that requires specific statutory authorization for freezing the assets invites the legislature to weigh in on the matter while at the same time publicly prompting the Security Council to improve its procedures. Another structural failure in democracies relates to 'discrete and insular minorities' whose interests are inadequately protected by the domestic democratic process.
49
When this is the case, ITs can often step in and operate as the external protectors of internal minorities. Such external protection can than provide grounds for NCs to offset pressure from domestic public opinion. It is in just such contexts that inter-court coordination is increasingly promoting democracy by ensuring a voice to certain minorities.
B Inter-Court Coordination Offsets 'Divide and Rule' Strategies
An additional benefit of inter-court coordination is the strategic gain that it provides to subsets of relatively weak countries that are imprisoned in their respective sovereignty cells and are subjected to the predatory policies of powerful states or economic actors who exploit divisions among them in order to extort concessions, much to the discontent of their domestic constituencies. Given their shared legal vocabulary, their commitment to following their own precedents, their relative immunity to special interests pressure, and their mutual knowledge of each other's preferences as revealed by their prior opinions, developing state NCs often have a refined knowledge about which of their peers are likely to support a given policy position and what position is likely to garner the greatest degree of support.
This information can then serve as a focal point for NCs in the developing world. In turn, these NCs can help overcome the uncertainty and distrust that typically characterize the relations among their political branches and lead to better choices. For example, developing countries would have served as the dumping ground for hazardous wastes produced in the rich North if not for the successful common resistance of southern NCs led by the Indian court. 50 NCs in Europe took an active part in demanding that IOs improve their internal labour standards and joined forces to reduce the IOs' immunity from their jurisdiction.
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ITs can resolve the collective action problems of states that are unable to overcome the 'sovereignty trap', and rebuff the demand of a powerful state or a multinational company that weaker states comply with its demands. The European courts in particular have been quite successful in this context, offering resistance to IOs that sought immunity from national labour laws, 52 or in imposing European legal standards on sporting associations that sought insulation from public law obligations.
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C Judicial Review and the Global Dimension of the Democratic Deficit
Of course, courts do more than provide information by their decisions and the doctrines they promote. At times they also deliver judgments that pre-empt political challenges: NCs may determine that certain policies are precluded by the national constitution or ITs may find a national law incompatible with a treaty obligation. Can these actions also be justified as democracy promoting? This question requires us to revisit the countermajoritarian difficulty from a global perspective that takes into account the unique failures of the domestic democratic processes that result from globalization.
We offer two answers to this question. The first answer minimizes the potentially negative effects of judicial intervention relative to the mostly unchecked power of the executive branches of powerful states, because the intervention of courts holds out potentially greater benefits for disenfranchised stakeholders. The second answer emphasizes the normative obligations that democracies have towards each other. These obligations legitimate the attention of both NCs and ITs to the interests of those affected stakeholders who are foreigners and have no voice in the domestic democratic process.
(i) Courts in powerful states are generally more 'friendly' toward diffuse majorities and the interests of weaker states than are their executive branches
We believe that in general strong courts are more likely than strong executive branches to promote the interests of diffused majorities and of weak states. 54 The reason for this lies in their very different modes of operation. Executives tend to employ complicated fragmentation strategies that operate to isolate and obscure their actions. This is typically done to increase the oversight costs that rival branches of government and weaker states must pay to question their actions. Courts, by contrast, generally employ what are essentially 'defragmentation strategies', 55 in the sense that they attempt to weave disparate executive-created policy fragments into webs of 52 coherent legal obligations that are transparent, well-reasoned, and accessible to all actors. These judicial efforts to generalize and rationalize the international legal landscape provide opposition parties and weaker states with a stable and interconnected hierarchy of claims -for example, linking trade obligations with human rights concernsthat they can then employ in a variety of venues to increase the likelihood that a victory in a particular venue will have wide-ranging implications. Increased collective action on the part of prominent NCs and cooperation with ITs hold out the promise of their creating, under the right political and social conditions, constellations of linked obligations that are more dense, more coherent, and more equitable than those that currently exist.
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Besides defragmenting the legal space, judicial coordination also generates information that has practical political benefits for diffuse constituencies. The litigation in the South African court concerning access to life-saving drugs, for example, helped reframe the public discourse about the costs of compliance with the TRIPs agreement to the populations in developing host countries. 57 A judgment in the Supreme Court of India endorsed an interpretation of India's IP law that restricted the 'evergreening' of drugs and thereby resisted the northern pharmaceutical companies's interpretation of the TRIPs agreement in the name of promoting the right to life.
58 NGOs committed to promoting the interests of constituencies in weaker states then use such information to raise global consciousness about the effects of IO policies in developing countries and among the less well represented within developed economies. 59 The resulting public awareness can prove politically significant not only in weak autocracies but also in strong democracies whose civil societies are sensitive to such concerns. As mentioned above, 60 the intervention of a handful of NCs of powerful states can generate a process of information dissemination that yields positive externalities for constituencies that do not even have independent courts.
As the story of the Van Gend judgment suggests, 61 NCs also provide a measure of cover for ITs and increase the likelihood that ITs will escape retribution if they deviate from the preferences of executives of powerful states. If NCs are expected to rule against them eventually in any event, executives may be more inclined to tolerate an IT's ruling. Finally and most importantly, as mentioned above, 62 judicial cooperation holds the promise of overcoming the predatory policies of powerful states and economic actors who exploit divisions among relatively weak states in order to extort concessions. Unable to overcome their political barriers, wary of being exploited, unsure whether they are involved in a repeated game, weak states find themselves competing against their peers to satisfy the demands of the powerful external actor, to the discontent of many of their domestic constituencies.
To conclude, at least at this juncture in the evolution of the global regulatory regime, IO-driven policies pose more severe countermajoritarian concerns than does judicial review by NCs. On the whole, judicial review by NCs is more likely to enhance domestic democracy than to curtail it.
(ii) Democracy (and hence courts) must take outsiders' interests into account
The countermajoritarian debate at the national level is based on the premise that the deliberative process should be open to all relevant stakeholders. The same premise lies at the heart of some philosophers' scepticism regarding the authority of international institutions and courts. The worry is that such international bodies fail to represent those stakeholders that domestic deliberative processes protect, since they do not act 'in the name of all the individuals whose lives they affect; and they do not ask for the kind of authorization by individuals that carries with it a responsibility to treat all those individuals in some sense equally ' . 63 Yet our observations about the democratic deficits that globalization often fosters suggest that this premise is outdated and no longer reflects current conditions of global interdependence. If one takes seriously the democratic impulse and adapts it to contemporary conditions, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that 'democracy' cannot be confined to the sovereign state as an insulated entity. Instead, every democracy must take others' interest into account even though the latter have no right to take part in the decision-making process. This can be explained on utilitarian-reciprocal grounds or on moral grounds. In either case, what is required is the understanding that judicial interference in decisionmaking for the purpose of including the voice of the globally-disregarded may well be compatible with and often mandated by democratic and egalitarian concerns, not a violation of them.
64 62 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 63 See Nagel, 'The Problem of Global Justice', 33 Philosophy and Public Affairs (2005) 113, at 138. Although Nagel clearly assumes that such conditions obtain within states and only within states, it is difficult to see how any democracy today fulfils these conditions without ensuring voice to affected foreigners.
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The literature on global justice is vast. Some of the leading books include C. it has conspicuously refused to appeal to the implied powers doctrine to assert its own authority to review the Security Council's resolutions. 69 The WTO Appellate Body has behaved similarly, 70 as compared with its rather timid treatment of the decision-making processes within the WTO Ministerial Conferences and the administrative bodies that remain opaque to civil society. 71 The relief comes from the NCs: when the IT is timid in reviewing the IO, NCs can step in and provide the missing layer of protection against abuse of authority. The Solange challenge to EU institutions raised by European NCs has had a significant effect in imposing obligations on EU institutions. This additional layer of protection, in turn, bolsters the IT. There is reason to believe, for example, that the pivotal Kadi judgment in 2008 72 was prompted by the concern that if the Grand Chamber did not review the EU policy, several NCs would step in and do this. In fact, the Court's Advocate General Miguel Maduro hinted in his opinion that NCs had both the authority and the willingness to step in if the ECJ would not, and that it was 'very unlikely that national measures for the implementation of [SCR] would enjoy immunity from [national] judicial review'. 73 It thus becomes apparent that the Van Gend judgment, while it has empowered lower courts in Europe by turning them into mini constitutional courts, 74 has also drawn support from them due to their implicit threat of intervention, and that this has provided backing for the more intrusive review of EU bodies.
It is obviously only speculative whether the ECJ envisaged this eventuality when delivering the Van Gend judgment. But this question is less important. What is important is to note that the symbiosis between ITs and NCs, as exemplified in the EU context, provides the most effective judicial mechanism to check IO decision-making.
